An index of all posts
The US Air Force uses a term called "Allowable Cabin Load" (ACL) for its transport aircraft. It is a planning figure used to determine the optimum average load its transport aircraft would carry during deployments.
Although the C-17 can carry a Maximum Payload of about 77 to 74 tonnes (according to the model), carrying such a load either reduces the range to non-trans-Atlantic distances, or requires in-flight refuelling, which requires a second aircraft to be sent to refuel it. With about 50 metric tonnes, the C-17 has a range of about 3,200NM, allowing a non-stop Charleston to Ireland flight, for example. To make it non-stop to Germany, the payload needs to be reduced to less than 40 tonnes. It may be possible with 40 tonnes from an Air Base farther north, such as Dover.
So to allow the aircraft to fly across the Atlantic non-stop and un-refuelled, the C-17's ACL is 45 short tons, so 40,8 metric tonnes (That's the plan anyway) .
I just found a paper that provides a few numbers, based on actual use of C-17 missions during Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF) , which is the Afghanistan Operation, and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
The average C-17 load during both of these missions averaged just around 18 tonnes (metric) on deployments and around 13 tonnes on redeployments. That's it. Barely C-130 Hercules-sized loads.
Of course, when a C-17 is used to carry personnel, with a full load of 102 troops (without the pallets), at 200 Kg each, it just has a payload of 20 tonnes, half of the C-17s' ACL. It's better to put them on a commercial flight. A CRAF B-747 can carry 350 and is much cheaper for flying troops than a C-17.
The US Air Force, in its planning documents, plans on an average daily use of 14.5 hours for its C-17 in times of crisis (The aircraft, I have no doubt, would be quite capable of maintaining such a tempo if it was operated by an effecient organisation).
Yet, at the peak of these two Operations, C-17 use never went above 5.84 hours per day.
Two of the reasons for the lack of hours (there are many) is lack of pilots and mis-management of the pilots they do have. You'd think the pilots were overworked?
US Air Force pilots are allowed to fly a Maximum of 120 hours in a 30 day period, and can get waivers to fly up to 150 hours in times of crisis.
Yet the average US C-17 pilot flies 43.2 hours a month, and in peak periods, the highest monthly average reached was 49.3 hours per pilot.
An average US airline pilot flies 78 hours a month.
Does anyone reading this Blog believe that the Canadian Air Force is more effecient with their Boeing C-17s than the US Air Force is with theirs?
We'll never know, since it's highly unlikely that the CF will ever publish such statisitics with the secrecy mentality that has prevailed at DND ever since the "New" government took power.
Friday, October 30, 2009
Thursday, October 29, 2009
The C-17 in the news
An index of all posts
Four recent articles, all from October 2009, about the fight between different factions within the US government to either cut or continue funding of the Boeing C-17. While the US is the most powerful nation on Earth, it oftens behaves like a third rate Banana Republic. This is a typical case of such behavior.
The Pentagon does not want more Boeing C-17s. President Obama does not want more Boeing C-17s.
But US Congressmen from 44 of the 50 US States want the Boeing C-17 production lines to stay open to protect the jobs they provide to their constituents. So against the wishes of the Pentagon, against the wishes of the US Air Force and against the wishes of the US President, Congress regularly votes more money for more C-17s which are imposed on the US Air Force. After voting for 120, they increased it to 180, then to 190, then to 205, then to 213, and now probably another 12 to 225.
Sounds unreal doesn't it ? Well read on.......
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This is a Los Angeles Times article by Michael Hiltzik, published on Oct 8, 2009
Billions are spent to defend 5,000 jobs at Boeing C-17 plant .
Could $2.5 billion be better spent on creating long-term training programs and developing new industries rather than keeping the Boeing plant open indefinitely merely to save jobs in Long Beach?
If you're interested in contemplating the harvest of this country's decades of failed economic policies, failed military policies and just plain failed politics -- and who isn't? -- I know just where to send you.
It's a Boeing aircraft factory on the outskirts of Long Beach Airport, where a brigade of 5,000 veteran workers can turn out 16 state-of-the-art C-17 military cargo planes every year.
This is the last factory in America capable of building large military aircraft, and it's headed for extinction.
In approving a $626-billion military budget for fiscal 2010 this week, the Senate threw in $2.5 billion for 10 more C-17s to be built at the plant. But the appropriation resembles a last desperate round of chemo prescribed for a patient whom the doctors aren't sure can be saved -- or should be. (The corresponding House bill calls for three planes, so the versions will have to be reconciled.)
The Air Force didn't actually request the planes approved by Congress; the service isn't sure that it needs any more C-17s beyond the 213 it already owns or has on order. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates wants to kill the program. So does Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), who launched an unsuccessful last-ditch attack on the appropriation.
President Obama has spoken in favor of the program, yet he hasn't told Gates to stand down, either.
Boeing says its current order book of 28 planes will keep the Long Beach assembly line running until July 2011. The House's three planes might extend that by a couple of months, the Senate's 10 planes by perhaps a year. Then it's over. The company says reopening the line once it's been mothballed would cost billions -- among other factors, the workforce would disperse, suppliers move on to other contracts, and tools and equipment get dismantled. So it argues that the government should keep the orders flowing against the chance that it will decide it wants a lot more C-17s after all -- something many defense analysts say is likely -- and to give the company more time to scare up foreign sales.
"We're at a no-kidding decision point," Tommy Dunehew, Boeing's vice president at the plant, told me this week.
Yet although the need to make a decision about the program's future is pressing, the decision-making process is muddled beyond measure.
The Government Accountability Office complained last November that not only had the Pentagon not decided on its optimum mix of C-17s and older C-5 cargo planes (which have more capacity and longer range but lower reliability), it hadn't even figured out how to decide. It wasn't even sure how to balance the cost perton of cargo hauled by one plane versus the other, the GAO said.
Nor has the country confronted an important economic question: Does it make sense to operate the Boeing plant indefinitely merely to preserve a few thousand jobs in Long Beach and at suppliers around the country? Or -- if jobs are the real goal here -- might it be better to spend the same money on creating long-term training programs and developing new industries?
"The same amount of money would create more jobs if it were spent on education, health or clean energy," says Robert Pollin, a University of Massachusetts economist who analyzed the effect of military spending in a paper for the Institute for Policy Studies. "You'd create more jobs not just next year, but in the next 10 years.
"That's especially true given that the C-17 workers are, shall we say, "mature." Their average age is about 56, so even under the best conditions they're closing in on retirement. It's not a rap on these crackerjack manufacturing hands to say they're not the wave of our industrial future.
But diverting government money from its incumbent recipients is never a political slam dunk. A $626-billion annual investment "has a lot of constituencies behind it," Pollin says.
Indeed, congressional debates over military procurement, while customarily couched in the vocabulary of national security, invariably reek of the pork barrel.
Boeing has been smart enough to source the C-17's parts from 650 suppliers in 44 states. So it's unsurprising that the Senate shot down McCain's effort to pare down the program this week by a 2-1 margin. Congressional love for the C-17 cuts across party lines and fiscal ideologies. Among its most stalwart defenders are California's Democratic Senators Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer. (The latter, burnishing her liberal cred, cites the plane’s suitability for “humanitarian” missions.)
Another fan is GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, whose Huntington Beach district is just down the road from the C-17 factory. Rohrabacher proclaimed his refusal to be "stampeded into spending hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars in a precipitous manner" when the subject was the banking bailout, and voted against the stimulus package this year.
But on the C-17, Rohrabacher swears that even if it were not built in California, "I'd still be in favor of it." Same with Sen. Kit Bond (R-Mo.), whose state is a big supplier to the C-17. He voted against the stimulus bill as a "budget buster" but voted for the C-17, which, as he told voters, will safeguard "1,200 jobs in Missouri.
"Whether an even greater number of jobs might be safeguarded or created by redeploying the money elsewhere rarely gets discussed in Congress, a body permanently afflicted with tunnel vision: McCain's argument against the C-17, for example, is that the $2.5 billion should be spent elsewhere in the military budget, not that it might more effectively be spent training schoolteachers or developing wind turbine technology.
There's no denying that the C-17 is a marvelous aircraft. Its builders are proud of its enviable operational record, maneuverability in tactical situations on the ground and efficiency in the air -- the C-17 can be flown for $11,300 per flying hour, compared with $23,100 for the C-5, the GAO says.
When I walked through the factory this week, Craig Johnson of Boeing's flight operations staff showed me how he could single-handedly reconfigure its cavernous interior from a cargo hold into a troop transport with seating for more than 100 troops, with or without parachutes, in a matter of minutes. The same job on a C-5, he said, would take several men several hours.
Yet the C-17's excellence is one of those facts that is indisputably true but irrelevant to the issue at hand, like the assertion that Roman Polanski makes great movies.
The program is on life support because the government's approach to defense manufacturing has been to ramp up and down to match the fiscal and military conditions of the moment, not to plan for the long term.
The government provoked the downsizing of the aerospace industry beginning in the late 1980s without thinking too hard about what might happen if we had to fight, oh, two wars at once on unconventional ground or supply military materiel from a single aging plant in California. Nurturing new industries and improving the academic achievement of U.S. school kids? Not on anyone's radar screen.
It's not clear what the right decision on the C-17 program would be just now. But we consistently get these things wrong -- either we're caught without an adequate military establishment, as in the run-up to World War II, or we place our bets on hugely expensive systems that get rendered irrelevant or superannuated before they can achieve liftoff. And the real key to national security, our civilian educational and technological infrastructure, gets consistently shortchanged.
Is this any way to stay on top in the modern world?
Michael Hiltzik's column appears Mondays and Thursdays. Reach him at michael.hiltzik@latimes.com, read him at www.latimes.com/hiltzik, and follow @latimeshiltzik on Twitter.
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On Oct 20, 2009, I found this article:
Congress guilty of wasteful spending on C-17 cargo plane
President Barack Obama hasn't used his veto pen yet to reject bad legislation from Congress, but he should if a defense spending bill reaches his desk with funding for C-17 cargo planes included.
Although there was a strong attempt to strip funding for 10 new cargo planes from the bill that passed the Senate two weeks ago, the $2.5 billion appropriation remained.
We applaud the efforts of Sen. John McCain, who spearheaded the effort and Wisconsin Sens. Russ Feingold and Herb Kohl for their support.
The $2.5 billion is a very small part of spending $636 billion on military appropriations, including the war in Afghanistan and health care for people in the military.
But the military didn't want the 10 C-17 planes — and repeatedly told this to Congress. They are simply not needed to carry troops and supplies around the world. There are enough cargo planes in the nation's inventory to do the job, according to military experts.
So, why was there such a fight to keep spending taxpayers' money on an unneeded and unwanted plane?
Backers of the spending say that there are thousands of jobs, mainly in California, dependent on building more C-17 planes. And lobbying to keep the money in the appropriations bill was heavy. Boeing, according to a report from the Center for Responsive Politics, spent $4.9 million on lobbying for the bill in just the first six months of the year.
Apparently lost on those who wanted to spend money on an unneeded plane was Sen. McCain's strong point to kill the funding when he said continuing the C-17 "will invariably result in a reduction in critical war-fighting capabilities somewhere else in the defense program."
A companion bill in the House contains money for three of the planes, so the two measures must be reconciled in a conference committee. We urge those opposed to spending money on unneeded planes keep up the pressure to rid the compromise bill of the $2.5 billion.
Earlier this year, a threatened Obama veto of funding for the F-22 Raptor jet helped defeat spending this unneeded plane. Obama should be prepared to do the same for the C-17 cargo plane.
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Then on Oct 22, 2009, we can read this Daily Herald article titled :
Audit clears Boeing in C-17 lobbying probe
Boeing Co. and the Air Force did not illegally collude to lobby the U.S. Congress in 2007 to approve buying additional C-17 cargo aircraft from the company, according to a Defense Department audit.
"We did not identify any instances where senior Air Force officials improperly approached or communicated to members of Congress regarding C-17 issues," the Pentagon inspector general said in an unreleased 35-page audit.
The Pentagon in 2007 said it did not want more C-17s than the 190 on contract. It got them anyway: Congress added 10 that year to a wartime spending bill, then added 15 to similar legislation for fiscal 2008 and eight for fiscal 2009.
While the inspector general concluded there was nothing illegal or improper in the Air Force's communications with Capitol Hill in 2007, the audit is additional evidence of how hard it is to terminate a popular weapons program.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates sought once again this year to stop funding for both the C-17 transport and a backup engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Both programs are still alive as Congress begins final deliberations on the fiscal 2010 defense budget.
The audit did find that the Air Force in 2007 had communications with Congress that were "inconsistent" with Pentagon budget plans, and it recommended that service Secretary Michael Donley review how the service communicates with Congress about weapons programs.
Donley's spokesman, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffry Glenn, said the service is reviewing the report.
Wish Lists
The Pentagon hasn't wanted to buy more C-17s since fiscal 2006, yet Congress continues to fund the program.
The Air Force, for example, during the fiscal 2008 budget process included two C-17s on a "wish list" of programs that the Pentagon's budget hadn't funded but the service wanted. The Congress has requested such lists since the mid-1990s. The Air Force asked for 15 more C-17s on its fiscal 2009 wish list.
Gates this year cracked down on the practice, requiring the service lists be reviewed by his office before submission. No C- 17s were on the Air Force list for fiscal 2010. Still, both the House and Senate added money for them in their separate versions of the defense budget.
McCain Sought Audit
The audit of the C-17 funding in 2007 was requested by Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona. He asked the Pentagon to review allegations that the Air Force that year improperly encouraged Chicago, Illinois-based Boeing to send the service and the Pentagon an unsolicited proposal for 30 additional transports and then lobby Congress to approve the purchase.
Boeing submitted the proposal but neither the Pentagon nor the service requested the planes, according to company spokesman Jerry Drelling. Still, Congress approved money that year to buy 10 more C-17s.
The probe took two years. The findings were sent to McCain six days before the Senate on Sept. 30 voted 64-34 to keep $2.5 billion for 10 more C-17s in the fiscal 2010 defense budget over objections from the White House, the Pentagon and McCain.
House and Senate leaders negotiating a compromise budget are likely to approve some and possibly all of the extra planes.
McCain likely would have used the audit to press his case against them had the report concluded Boeing and Air Force illegally colluded in 2007.
"There were enough allegations that we thought it deserved an investigation -- that the Air Force had weighed in on the issue in a way that was counter to the DoD policy," McCain said in an interview. "Apparently, there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that," he said. "I accept the findings."
Suspicions of Lobbying
McCain in a Sept. 11, 2007, letter to then-Inspector General Claude Kicklighter sought a review of what he termed the Air Force's "creative and aggressive advocacy of plans to procure additional C-17s not included in the fiscal 2008 budget."
"The Air Force appears to be facilitating a possibly huge earmark -- as many as 30 C-17s at a possible cost of at least $250 million each," he wrote. "If true, this would be an undesirable use of Defense resources."
Deputy Inspector General Donald Horstman said the audit did not find Air Force officials took "improper" actions "with respect to the issues described by Sen. McCain."
The IG uncovered "numerous" instances where senior Air Force officials communicated with lawmakers and staff about the C-17 program and a separate service plan that called for replacing 30 older C-5 transports with C-17s, he said.
Still, "those communications did not violate law or regulation and were not otherwise improper," Horstman wrote. Nor did Air Force officials "make commitments to Boeing for the acquisition of aircraft."
Boeing spokesman Drelling said the company "has not seen the report and is unable to comment on it at this time."
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And finally, on Oct 28, 2009, the Press-Telegram has this article, signed Kristopher Hanson
Defense bill includes funds for up to 10 Boeing C-17s
WASHINGTON - President Barack Obama signed a $680 billion defense budget Wednesday that includes funding for up to 10 new Boeing C-17s, though Congress will decide in December just how many jets are ultimately ordered.
The bill signed by Obama at the White House - who previously objected to continued C-17 production - comes after months of uncertainty on the massive cargo plane's future, which had been scheduled to end production in mid-2011.
The new defense budget includes the $2.5 billion needed to build 10 more C-17s, though it doesn't specify exactly how the money will be spent.
That will be decided during negotiations between Senate and House members in December, when billions included in the budget are effectively divvied up for dozens of military projects, including C-17 production.
The House earlier this year had approved about $650 million for just three C-17s, but signaled it would likely support the 10 planes approved by the Senate when it agreed to include the $2.5 billion in the bill sent to Obama.
Congresswoman Laura Richardson, D-Long Beach, who sat on the House-Senate committee which finalized the bill signed by Obama, said support remains strong to purchase 10 planes, which would keep the plant and its 5,000 workers going through 2012.
"With the President signing the Defense Authorization Act into law today, the Long Beach workforce and residents are one step closer to extending the C-17 line into 2012 and preserving 5,000 local jobs," Richardson said following the signing ceremony at the Rose Garden. ""The House and Senate have both passed their versions of the appropriations bill, and a joint conference will finalize funding; however, $2.5 billion was included in the Authorization Act and is sufficient to place an order of 10 C-17s."
Richardson said Congressman Jack Murtha, D-Penn., who chairs the Defense Appropriations Committee in the House, has signaled support for the Senate's overwhelming desire to fund 10 C-17s, which the upper chamber approved in early October on a 93-7 vote.
"I have and will continue to reach out to Chairman Murtha to make sure the C-17s are adequately funded, though all of his responses have been positive," Richardson said. "Once the conference committee meets, I am confident that a resolution will be worked out providing appropriations for the necessary C-17s."
Meanwhile, in Long Beach, Boeing officials remain cautious despite Wednesday's news.
"It's not over yet," said Boeing Spokesman Jerry Drelling. "We continue to remain optimistic that when (Congress) meets to discuss defense appropriations in December, the support will remain for 10, or close to 10, C-17s. We're grateful for the support Congress continues to give for this important aircraft."
Throughout the summer and early fall, the White House had asked Congress to end funding for the plane, saying the 213 ordered are enough for the nation's military and humanitarian needs. Boeing delivered the 190th C-17 to the Air Force on Wednesday, which it plans to base at Charleston Air Force Base in South Carolina.
Obama alluded to the C-17 and other "pet projects" championed by senators during the signing ceremony and praised lawmakers for stripping some $35-billion in funding for the F-22 fighter jet and a new White House helicopter fleet.
"Wasting these dollars makes us less secure," Obama said Wednesday. "And that's why we have passed a defense bill that eliminates some of the waste and inefficiency in our defense process. Today we have proved that change is possible. It may not come quickly or all at once, but if you push hard enough, it does come."
Earlier this summer, as Congress was negotiating the defense bill, he indicated his desire that they not include more funding for the plane, which made its introduction in 1993.
"The administration strongly objects to funding for unrequested C-17 airlift aircraft," the White House stated at the time. "Analyses by the DOD have shown that the C-17s in the force and on order, together with the existing fleet of (Lockheed) C-5 aircraft, are sufficient to meet the Department's future airlift needs, even under the most stressing situations."
Still, despite his position, the $2.5 billion included in the budget wasn't enough to prompt a veto.
But Obama's objections, backed by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, indicate the Boeing airlifter may have a more difficult time securing domestic orders next year - a fact that has prompted the company to aggressively market the aircraft abroad.
Already, more than a dozen C-17s have been collectively sold to the United Kingdom, Qatar, Canada and Australia in recent years, as well as a NATO-led consortium based in Hungary.
The United Arab Emirates has expressed interest in purchasing four of the heavy-lift aircraft and is expected to announce a deal soon, while the Indian Air Force is exploring purchasing as many as 10 C-17s in coming years, though negotiations are in very early stages and any aircraft are not likely to be built before 2013.
For those reasons, the domestic order this year could serve as a bridge until more foreign orders are drummed up. The federal government estimates closing the plant and re-opening could cost in excess of $1 billion.
Boeing says it needs about 12 orders annually to justify high labor and production costs and reassure its suppliers of the need to continue investing in C-17 parts.
In recent years, C-17s - along with heavy-lift helicopters - have been used extensively in Iraq and Afghanistan to ferry supplies and troops between remote military outposts, largely replacing the vehicle convoys regularly used in the early days of both wars that were often destroyed by roadside attacks and bombs.
The effort, supporters say, has helped cut troop casualties while speeding up delivery of supplies. The C-17 is the globe's only large cargo plane able to land on unpaved, short landing strips in remote regions inaccessible to other large aircraft such as Lockheed's C-5.
The jet is capable of carrying large armored vehicles and tanks, tons of supplies or dozens of troops and their equipment, depending on need.
For example, Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell lauded the plane's usefulness Oct. 1 as it began delivering the first of more than 6,600 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected, or MRAP, vehicles to troops in Afghanistan. The "life-saving" vehicles will replace many of the armored Humvees currently in use, which have been criticized as inadequate navigating much of Afghanistan's rugged terrain, Morrell said.
Several hundred will be delivered into the region per month - primarily aboard C-17s - as the military gears up for what's expected to be an intense fight against insurgents based in mountain hideouts.
The C-17 has also frequently been called into service to deliver medical supplies, food, water and other necessities in the wake of natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, and more recently, the earthquake and tsunami that devastated parts of Samoa, American Samoa and Tonga in late September.
Shortly after that disaster, the Defense Department reported dispatching a fleet of C-17s based in Washington state and loaded with hundreds of laptop computers, pallets of medicine, tents, radios and satellite terminals, as well as nurses and doctors to help in the relief effort, to the tiny string of South Pacific islands.
kristopher.hanson@presstelegram.com, 562-499-1466
Four recent articles, all from October 2009, about the fight between different factions within the US government to either cut or continue funding of the Boeing C-17. While the US is the most powerful nation on Earth, it oftens behaves like a third rate Banana Republic. This is a typical case of such behavior.
The Pentagon does not want more Boeing C-17s. President Obama does not want more Boeing C-17s.
But US Congressmen from 44 of the 50 US States want the Boeing C-17 production lines to stay open to protect the jobs they provide to their constituents. So against the wishes of the Pentagon, against the wishes of the US Air Force and against the wishes of the US President, Congress regularly votes more money for more C-17s which are imposed on the US Air Force. After voting for 120, they increased it to 180, then to 190, then to 205, then to 213, and now probably another 12 to 225.
Sounds unreal doesn't it ? Well read on.......
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
This is a Los Angeles Times article by Michael Hiltzik, published on Oct 8, 2009
Billions are spent to defend 5,000 jobs at Boeing C-17 plant .
Could $2.5 billion be better spent on creating long-term training programs and developing new industries rather than keeping the Boeing plant open indefinitely merely to save jobs in Long Beach?
If you're interested in contemplating the harvest of this country's decades of failed economic policies, failed military policies and just plain failed politics -- and who isn't? -- I know just where to send you.
It's a Boeing aircraft factory on the outskirts of Long Beach Airport, where a brigade of 5,000 veteran workers can turn out 16 state-of-the-art C-17 military cargo planes every year.
This is the last factory in America capable of building large military aircraft, and it's headed for extinction.
In approving a $626-billion military budget for fiscal 2010 this week, the Senate threw in $2.5 billion for 10 more C-17s to be built at the plant. But the appropriation resembles a last desperate round of chemo prescribed for a patient whom the doctors aren't sure can be saved -- or should be. (The corresponding House bill calls for three planes, so the versions will have to be reconciled.)
The Air Force didn't actually request the planes approved by Congress; the service isn't sure that it needs any more C-17s beyond the 213 it already owns or has on order. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates wants to kill the program. So does Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), who launched an unsuccessful last-ditch attack on the appropriation.
President Obama has spoken in favor of the program, yet he hasn't told Gates to stand down, either.
Boeing says its current order book of 28 planes will keep the Long Beach assembly line running until July 2011. The House's three planes might extend that by a couple of months, the Senate's 10 planes by perhaps a year. Then it's over. The company says reopening the line once it's been mothballed would cost billions -- among other factors, the workforce would disperse, suppliers move on to other contracts, and tools and equipment get dismantled. So it argues that the government should keep the orders flowing against the chance that it will decide it wants a lot more C-17s after all -- something many defense analysts say is likely -- and to give the company more time to scare up foreign sales.
"We're at a no-kidding decision point," Tommy Dunehew, Boeing's vice president at the plant, told me this week.
Yet although the need to make a decision about the program's future is pressing, the decision-making process is muddled beyond measure.
The Government Accountability Office complained last November that not only had the Pentagon not decided on its optimum mix of C-17s and older C-5 cargo planes (which have more capacity and longer range but lower reliability), it hadn't even figured out how to decide. It wasn't even sure how to balance the cost perton of cargo hauled by one plane versus the other, the GAO said.
Nor has the country confronted an important economic question: Does it make sense to operate the Boeing plant indefinitely merely to preserve a few thousand jobs in Long Beach and at suppliers around the country? Or -- if jobs are the real goal here -- might it be better to spend the same money on creating long-term training programs and developing new industries?
"The same amount of money would create more jobs if it were spent on education, health or clean energy," says Robert Pollin, a University of Massachusetts economist who analyzed the effect of military spending in a paper for the Institute for Policy Studies. "You'd create more jobs not just next year, but in the next 10 years.
"That's especially true given that the C-17 workers are, shall we say, "mature." Their average age is about 56, so even under the best conditions they're closing in on retirement. It's not a rap on these crackerjack manufacturing hands to say they're not the wave of our industrial future.
But diverting government money from its incumbent recipients is never a political slam dunk. A $626-billion annual investment "has a lot of constituencies behind it," Pollin says.
Indeed, congressional debates over military procurement, while customarily couched in the vocabulary of national security, invariably reek of the pork barrel.
Boeing has been smart enough to source the C-17's parts from 650 suppliers in 44 states. So it's unsurprising that the Senate shot down McCain's effort to pare down the program this week by a 2-1 margin. Congressional love for the C-17 cuts across party lines and fiscal ideologies. Among its most stalwart defenders are California's Democratic Senators Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer. (The latter, burnishing her liberal cred, cites the plane’s suitability for “humanitarian” missions.)
Another fan is GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, whose Huntington Beach district is just down the road from the C-17 factory. Rohrabacher proclaimed his refusal to be "stampeded into spending hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars in a precipitous manner" when the subject was the banking bailout, and voted against the stimulus package this year.
But on the C-17, Rohrabacher swears that even if it were not built in California, "I'd still be in favor of it." Same with Sen. Kit Bond (R-Mo.), whose state is a big supplier to the C-17. He voted against the stimulus bill as a "budget buster" but voted for the C-17, which, as he told voters, will safeguard "1,200 jobs in Missouri.
"Whether an even greater number of jobs might be safeguarded or created by redeploying the money elsewhere rarely gets discussed in Congress, a body permanently afflicted with tunnel vision: McCain's argument against the C-17, for example, is that the $2.5 billion should be spent elsewhere in the military budget, not that it might more effectively be spent training schoolteachers or developing wind turbine technology.
There's no denying that the C-17 is a marvelous aircraft. Its builders are proud of its enviable operational record, maneuverability in tactical situations on the ground and efficiency in the air -- the C-17 can be flown for $11,300 per flying hour, compared with $23,100 for the C-5, the GAO says.
When I walked through the factory this week, Craig Johnson of Boeing's flight operations staff showed me how he could single-handedly reconfigure its cavernous interior from a cargo hold into a troop transport with seating for more than 100 troops, with or without parachutes, in a matter of minutes. The same job on a C-5, he said, would take several men several hours.
Yet the C-17's excellence is one of those facts that is indisputably true but irrelevant to the issue at hand, like the assertion that Roman Polanski makes great movies.
The program is on life support because the government's approach to defense manufacturing has been to ramp up and down to match the fiscal and military conditions of the moment, not to plan for the long term.
The government provoked the downsizing of the aerospace industry beginning in the late 1980s without thinking too hard about what might happen if we had to fight, oh, two wars at once on unconventional ground or supply military materiel from a single aging plant in California. Nurturing new industries and improving the academic achievement of U.S. school kids? Not on anyone's radar screen.
It's not clear what the right decision on the C-17 program would be just now. But we consistently get these things wrong -- either we're caught without an adequate military establishment, as in the run-up to World War II, or we place our bets on hugely expensive systems that get rendered irrelevant or superannuated before they can achieve liftoff. And the real key to national security, our civilian educational and technological infrastructure, gets consistently shortchanged.
Is this any way to stay on top in the modern world?
Michael Hiltzik's column appears Mondays and Thursdays. Reach him at michael.hiltzik@latimes.com, read him at www.latimes.com/hiltzik, and follow @latimeshiltzik on Twitter.
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On Oct 20, 2009, I found this article:
Congress guilty of wasteful spending on C-17 cargo plane
President Barack Obama hasn't used his veto pen yet to reject bad legislation from Congress, but he should if a defense spending bill reaches his desk with funding for C-17 cargo planes included.
Although there was a strong attempt to strip funding for 10 new cargo planes from the bill that passed the Senate two weeks ago, the $2.5 billion appropriation remained.
We applaud the efforts of Sen. John McCain, who spearheaded the effort and Wisconsin Sens. Russ Feingold and Herb Kohl for their support.
The $2.5 billion is a very small part of spending $636 billion on military appropriations, including the war in Afghanistan and health care for people in the military.
But the military didn't want the 10 C-17 planes — and repeatedly told this to Congress. They are simply not needed to carry troops and supplies around the world. There are enough cargo planes in the nation's inventory to do the job, according to military experts.
So, why was there such a fight to keep spending taxpayers' money on an unneeded and unwanted plane?
Backers of the spending say that there are thousands of jobs, mainly in California, dependent on building more C-17 planes. And lobbying to keep the money in the appropriations bill was heavy. Boeing, according to a report from the Center for Responsive Politics, spent $4.9 million on lobbying for the bill in just the first six months of the year.
Apparently lost on those who wanted to spend money on an unneeded plane was Sen. McCain's strong point to kill the funding when he said continuing the C-17 "will invariably result in a reduction in critical war-fighting capabilities somewhere else in the defense program."
A companion bill in the House contains money for three of the planes, so the two measures must be reconciled in a conference committee. We urge those opposed to spending money on unneeded planes keep up the pressure to rid the compromise bill of the $2.5 billion.
Earlier this year, a threatened Obama veto of funding for the F-22 Raptor jet helped defeat spending this unneeded plane. Obama should be prepared to do the same for the C-17 cargo plane.
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Then on Oct 22, 2009, we can read this Daily Herald article titled :
Audit clears Boeing in C-17 lobbying probe
Boeing Co. and the Air Force did not illegally collude to lobby the U.S. Congress in 2007 to approve buying additional C-17 cargo aircraft from the company, according to a Defense Department audit.
"We did not identify any instances where senior Air Force officials improperly approached or communicated to members of Congress regarding C-17 issues," the Pentagon inspector general said in an unreleased 35-page audit.
The Pentagon in 2007 said it did not want more C-17s than the 190 on contract. It got them anyway: Congress added 10 that year to a wartime spending bill, then added 15 to similar legislation for fiscal 2008 and eight for fiscal 2009.
While the inspector general concluded there was nothing illegal or improper in the Air Force's communications with Capitol Hill in 2007, the audit is additional evidence of how hard it is to terminate a popular weapons program.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates sought once again this year to stop funding for both the C-17 transport and a backup engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Both programs are still alive as Congress begins final deliberations on the fiscal 2010 defense budget.
The audit did find that the Air Force in 2007 had communications with Congress that were "inconsistent" with Pentagon budget plans, and it recommended that service Secretary Michael Donley review how the service communicates with Congress about weapons programs.
Donley's spokesman, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffry Glenn, said the service is reviewing the report.
Wish Lists
The Pentagon hasn't wanted to buy more C-17s since fiscal 2006, yet Congress continues to fund the program.
The Air Force, for example, during the fiscal 2008 budget process included two C-17s on a "wish list" of programs that the Pentagon's budget hadn't funded but the service wanted. The Congress has requested such lists since the mid-1990s. The Air Force asked for 15 more C-17s on its fiscal 2009 wish list.
Gates this year cracked down on the practice, requiring the service lists be reviewed by his office before submission. No C- 17s were on the Air Force list for fiscal 2010. Still, both the House and Senate added money for them in their separate versions of the defense budget.
McCain Sought Audit
The audit of the C-17 funding in 2007 was requested by Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona. He asked the Pentagon to review allegations that the Air Force that year improperly encouraged Chicago, Illinois-based Boeing to send the service and the Pentagon an unsolicited proposal for 30 additional transports and then lobby Congress to approve the purchase.
Boeing submitted the proposal but neither the Pentagon nor the service requested the planes, according to company spokesman Jerry Drelling. Still, Congress approved money that year to buy 10 more C-17s.
The probe took two years. The findings were sent to McCain six days before the Senate on Sept. 30 voted 64-34 to keep $2.5 billion for 10 more C-17s in the fiscal 2010 defense budget over objections from the White House, the Pentagon and McCain.
House and Senate leaders negotiating a compromise budget are likely to approve some and possibly all of the extra planes.
McCain likely would have used the audit to press his case against them had the report concluded Boeing and Air Force illegally colluded in 2007.
"There were enough allegations that we thought it deserved an investigation -- that the Air Force had weighed in on the issue in a way that was counter to the DoD policy," McCain said in an interview. "Apparently, there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that," he said. "I accept the findings."
Suspicions of Lobbying
McCain in a Sept. 11, 2007, letter to then-Inspector General Claude Kicklighter sought a review of what he termed the Air Force's "creative and aggressive advocacy of plans to procure additional C-17s not included in the fiscal 2008 budget."
"The Air Force appears to be facilitating a possibly huge earmark -- as many as 30 C-17s at a possible cost of at least $250 million each," he wrote. "If true, this would be an undesirable use of Defense resources."
Deputy Inspector General Donald Horstman said the audit did not find Air Force officials took "improper" actions "with respect to the issues described by Sen. McCain."
The IG uncovered "numerous" instances where senior Air Force officials communicated with lawmakers and staff about the C-17 program and a separate service plan that called for replacing 30 older C-5 transports with C-17s, he said.
Still, "those communications did not violate law or regulation and were not otherwise improper," Horstman wrote. Nor did Air Force officials "make commitments to Boeing for the acquisition of aircraft."
Boeing spokesman Drelling said the company "has not seen the report and is unable to comment on it at this time."
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And finally, on Oct 28, 2009, the Press-Telegram has this article, signed Kristopher Hanson
Defense bill includes funds for up to 10 Boeing C-17s
WASHINGTON - President Barack Obama signed a $680 billion defense budget Wednesday that includes funding for up to 10 new Boeing C-17s, though Congress will decide in December just how many jets are ultimately ordered.
The bill signed by Obama at the White House - who previously objected to continued C-17 production - comes after months of uncertainty on the massive cargo plane's future, which had been scheduled to end production in mid-2011.
The new defense budget includes the $2.5 billion needed to build 10 more C-17s, though it doesn't specify exactly how the money will be spent.
That will be decided during negotiations between Senate and House members in December, when billions included in the budget are effectively divvied up for dozens of military projects, including C-17 production.
The House earlier this year had approved about $650 million for just three C-17s, but signaled it would likely support the 10 planes approved by the Senate when it agreed to include the $2.5 billion in the bill sent to Obama.
Congresswoman Laura Richardson, D-Long Beach, who sat on the House-Senate committee which finalized the bill signed by Obama, said support remains strong to purchase 10 planes, which would keep the plant and its 5,000 workers going through 2012.
"With the President signing the Defense Authorization Act into law today, the Long Beach workforce and residents are one step closer to extending the C-17 line into 2012 and preserving 5,000 local jobs," Richardson said following the signing ceremony at the Rose Garden. ""The House and Senate have both passed their versions of the appropriations bill, and a joint conference will finalize funding; however, $2.5 billion was included in the Authorization Act and is sufficient to place an order of 10 C-17s."
Richardson said Congressman Jack Murtha, D-Penn., who chairs the Defense Appropriations Committee in the House, has signaled support for the Senate's overwhelming desire to fund 10 C-17s, which the upper chamber approved in early October on a 93-7 vote.
"I have and will continue to reach out to Chairman Murtha to make sure the C-17s are adequately funded, though all of his responses have been positive," Richardson said. "Once the conference committee meets, I am confident that a resolution will be worked out providing appropriations for the necessary C-17s."
Meanwhile, in Long Beach, Boeing officials remain cautious despite Wednesday's news.
"It's not over yet," said Boeing Spokesman Jerry Drelling. "We continue to remain optimistic that when (Congress) meets to discuss defense appropriations in December, the support will remain for 10, or close to 10, C-17s. We're grateful for the support Congress continues to give for this important aircraft."
Throughout the summer and early fall, the White House had asked Congress to end funding for the plane, saying the 213 ordered are enough for the nation's military and humanitarian needs. Boeing delivered the 190th C-17 to the Air Force on Wednesday, which it plans to base at Charleston Air Force Base in South Carolina.
Obama alluded to the C-17 and other "pet projects" championed by senators during the signing ceremony and praised lawmakers for stripping some $35-billion in funding for the F-22 fighter jet and a new White House helicopter fleet.
"Wasting these dollars makes us less secure," Obama said Wednesday. "And that's why we have passed a defense bill that eliminates some of the waste and inefficiency in our defense process. Today we have proved that change is possible. It may not come quickly or all at once, but if you push hard enough, it does come."
Earlier this summer, as Congress was negotiating the defense bill, he indicated his desire that they not include more funding for the plane, which made its introduction in 1993.
"The administration strongly objects to funding for unrequested C-17 airlift aircraft," the White House stated at the time. "Analyses by the DOD have shown that the C-17s in the force and on order, together with the existing fleet of (Lockheed) C-5 aircraft, are sufficient to meet the Department's future airlift needs, even under the most stressing situations."
Still, despite his position, the $2.5 billion included in the budget wasn't enough to prompt a veto.
But Obama's objections, backed by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, indicate the Boeing airlifter may have a more difficult time securing domestic orders next year - a fact that has prompted the company to aggressively market the aircraft abroad.
Already, more than a dozen C-17s have been collectively sold to the United Kingdom, Qatar, Canada and Australia in recent years, as well as a NATO-led consortium based in Hungary.
The United Arab Emirates has expressed interest in purchasing four of the heavy-lift aircraft and is expected to announce a deal soon, while the Indian Air Force is exploring purchasing as many as 10 C-17s in coming years, though negotiations are in very early stages and any aircraft are not likely to be built before 2013.
For those reasons, the domestic order this year could serve as a bridge until more foreign orders are drummed up. The federal government estimates closing the plant and re-opening could cost in excess of $1 billion.
Boeing says it needs about 12 orders annually to justify high labor and production costs and reassure its suppliers of the need to continue investing in C-17 parts.
In recent years, C-17s - along with heavy-lift helicopters - have been used extensively in Iraq and Afghanistan to ferry supplies and troops between remote military outposts, largely replacing the vehicle convoys regularly used in the early days of both wars that were often destroyed by roadside attacks and bombs.
The effort, supporters say, has helped cut troop casualties while speeding up delivery of supplies. The C-17 is the globe's only large cargo plane able to land on unpaved, short landing strips in remote regions inaccessible to other large aircraft such as Lockheed's C-5.
The jet is capable of carrying large armored vehicles and tanks, tons of supplies or dozens of troops and their equipment, depending on need.
For example, Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell lauded the plane's usefulness Oct. 1 as it began delivering the first of more than 6,600 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected, or MRAP, vehicles to troops in Afghanistan. The "life-saving" vehicles will replace many of the armored Humvees currently in use, which have been criticized as inadequate navigating much of Afghanistan's rugged terrain, Morrell said.
Several hundred will be delivered into the region per month - primarily aboard C-17s - as the military gears up for what's expected to be an intense fight against insurgents based in mountain hideouts.
The C-17 has also frequently been called into service to deliver medical supplies, food, water and other necessities in the wake of natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, and more recently, the earthquake and tsunami that devastated parts of Samoa, American Samoa and Tonga in late September.
Shortly after that disaster, the Defense Department reported dispatching a fleet of C-17s based in Washington state and loaded with hundreds of laptop computers, pallets of medicine, tents, radios and satellite terminals, as well as nurses and doctors to help in the relief effort, to the tiny string of South Pacific islands.
kristopher.hanson@presstelegram.com, 562-499-1466
Thursday, October 01, 2009
A picture is worth a thousand words
An index of all posts
Here are front view pictures of the Boeing C-17 (top) and of the Ilyushin Il-76 (bottom) Strategic Airlifters. They both claim to have tactical capabilities.
The former was made to land on semi-prepared runways that have to be specially "prepared" to allow for C-17 landings (See this document, written by a USAF Major, that details the issue) .
The latter was made to land on regular un-surfaced runways such as those that are found throughout the World.
The C-17's Maximum landing Weight of 202.7 tonnes is spread out to 14 wheels (to average approx 14.48 tonnes per wheel)
The Il-76's Maximum landing Weight of 155 tonnes is spread out to 20 wheels (to average approx 7.75 tonnes per wheel)
(To compare with what is known in the "West", the C-130H Hercules, with its Max landing weight of 59 tonnes spread out to 6 wheels, comes out to 9.83 tonnes per wheel. The CF's CC-150 Polaris, which is a converted A-310-304, has a 10 wheels and a Maximum Landing Weight of 124 tonnes: that comes out to 12.4 tonnes per wheel, so very close to the Boeing C-17's footprint !. You can check the scientific numbers, called Aircraft Loading Tables on Transport Canada's website )
This is why the Il-76 can land on most unpaved runways in Canada that are long enough (such as Alert) and why the C-17 cannot land in any of them.
Here are front view pictures of the Boeing C-17 (top) and of the Ilyushin Il-76 (bottom) Strategic Airlifters. They both claim to have tactical capabilities.
The former was made to land on semi-prepared runways that have to be specially "prepared" to allow for C-17 landings (See this document, written by a USAF Major, that details the issue) .
The latter was made to land on regular un-surfaced runways such as those that are found throughout the World.
The C-17's Maximum landing Weight of 202.7 tonnes is spread out to 14 wheels (to average approx 14.48 tonnes per wheel)
The Il-76's Maximum landing Weight of 155 tonnes is spread out to 20 wheels (to average approx 7.75 tonnes per wheel)
(To compare with what is known in the "West", the C-130H Hercules, with its Max landing weight of 59 tonnes spread out to 6 wheels, comes out to 9.83 tonnes per wheel. The CF's CC-150 Polaris, which is a converted A-310-304, has a 10 wheels and a Maximum Landing Weight of 124 tonnes: that comes out to 12.4 tonnes per wheel, so very close to the Boeing C-17's footprint !. You can check the scientific numbers, called Aircraft Loading Tables on Transport Canada's website )
This is why the Il-76 can land on most unpaved runways in Canada that are long enough (such as Alert) and why the C-17 cannot land in any of them.
Saturday, September 26, 2009
NATO's SALIS and SAC - A suggestion
An index of all posts
BACKGROUND
With NATO's first time involvement in a conflict that was not only outside of Europe, but was located in far-away and land-locked Afghanistan, most of the Alliance's members felt the dire need for heavy ramped Strategic Airlift, a resource possessed in 2001 by only two NATO/ISAF members, the US with its 200+ C-5s and C-17s fleet, and Great Britain, which had, just the previous year, leased 4 C-17s from Boeing.
The rests of the NATO members had only tactical aircraft such as C-130s and C-160s or larger so-called "strategic aircraft" that were based on civilian airliners, meaning not only that they were devoid of a rear loading ramp and thus unable to carry any of the rolling stock or any of the helicopters, but needed airport equipment to offload them : aircraft such as the A310 (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany) , the L-1011 and the VC-10 (United Kingdom). None of the non-NATO members of ISAF had any real ramped Strategic Airlift either. In the early days of post-911, the USA obliged its eager allies with its own fleet of C-17s and C-5s to move troops, equipment and supplies into Afghanistan, but when in early 2003, they turned their focus away from Afghanistan and toward Iraq, they needed their Strategic Aircraft for themselves and the members of the "Coalition of the Willing", those like the UK that were willing to attack Iraq with them. The ISAF nations not involved in Iraq were left holding the pot in Afghanistan and there was a scramble to hire and lease the only ramped strategic aircraft that were available for hire, and those were the hundreds of civilian-registered Il-76s that were operated by many countries and the 20 or so An-124s that were operated mainly by three airlines: Antonov Airlines, Volga-Dnepr and Polet. Antonov Airlines also had two other aircraft, a single An-225 that was pressed into Afghan service for certain flights and one An-22. Thes two aircraft completed the World's civilian ramped Strategic Aircraft fleet.
This Strategic Airlift crisis, prompted Germany in 2005 to get 15 members of NATO, including Canada, to pool together to create SALIS, the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution, which was anugurated in early 2006. Its members all paid for a certain number of hours of An-124 use (each according to their respective needs), which gives them guaranteed use of two full-time An-124s which are based at Leipzig-Halle, and quick access to 4 other An-124. The An-124s are provided by Ukrainian Antonov Airlines and Russian Volga-Dnepr Airlines. These aircraft are civilian-registered and are operated, crewed and maintained by civilian personnel of their respective airlines. NATO's Website has a page on SALIS here.
(Note: you'll remember that Germany, who operated East-Germany-inherited Soviet built aircraft in 1989, is not as adverse as other older NATO members to use Eastern-built aircraft and was the one Western country that seriously considered purchasing the Ukrainian An-70 rather than sign on to the Airbus A-400M project)
Later in 2006, the US agressively promoted an idea for NATO members to pool together for a long term Strategic Airlift unit that would mimic the 15-member pool that NATO had long ago established to operate its E-3A AWACS. This pool, called Strategic Airlift Capability, or SAC, would purchase and operate a number of Boeing C-17 Strategic Airlift aircraft. The pilots would come from the armed forces of the SAC member countries, and the maintenance would be contracted out to Boeing. After much pressure on the part of the US for NATO members to join, SAC was finally created with 10 NATO countries and two Partners for Peace countries. It is based in Hungary. SAC has recently taken delivery of its first C-17s. Although very expensive to purchase and operate, I had suggested earlier that Canada should join SAC rather than purchase and operate its own C-17s. In a pool, at least one pays for a limited number of hours, even if those hours are expensive. When one operates a fleet of aircraft, the costs are astronomical.
In the meantime, Canada purchased 4 C-17s and Great Britain not only purchased the 4 it had previously leased in 2000, but purchased 2 more, for a total of 6 RAF C-17s. The US, which had capped it orders at 180 C-17s, increased them 190, then to 205 earlier this year.
SALIS, has for members Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Turkey.
The NATO members which joined SAC are Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and the United States.
Because it is certainly related and has an impact on their country's interest in SALIS and SAC, these are the NATO countries that are waiting for the Airbus A-400Ms they ordered: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Finland and Sweden, which are not NATO members, also have A-400Ms on order.
The UK owns 6 C-17s and has 25 A-400Ms on order.
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain and the UK are all members of SALIS and also have Airbus A-400Ms on order.
The US will have 205 C-17 when all are delivered (it has taken delivery of about 196 as I write these words) and a little over 100 C-5s (some are being retired), plus is a the founding member of SAC which is to have a total of 3 C-17s.
Canada, which has 4 C-17s of its own is a also a member of SALIS.
Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia and Sweden are members of both SALIS and SAC.
All these measures and acquisitions do not prevent most NATO members from regularly chartering extra civilian Strategic Aircraft to meet their transport needs. Many NATO members regularly not only charter An-124 and An-225 outside of the SALIS contract, but mostly, many members, including Canada, have on-going contracts with several operators of the smaller 45 to 50 tonne capacity IL-76. This is because often the An-124s are just too big for the immediate needs of the NATO members and the smaller Il-76 is better suited to the trip. An IL-76 costs about 50% less to charter than an An-124 but it can carry all but the largest and the heaviest of the tanks and other outsize military vehicles. The IL-76 can land in relatively short unpaved runways, which the civilian An-124s do not do. Its landing gear configuration gives it a very low Aircraft Classification Number, which allows it to land in certain soft runways that are off limits to the C-17. The vast majority of the Canadian military supplies and hardware in Afghanistan were flown in, not in An-124s, but inside IL-76s. Even today, although Canada' Air Force owns and operates 4 C-17s and is a member of SALIS, it still makes liberal use of IL-76 charters. As we can read in the article "Not letting the dust settle" of this issue of the 9 July 2008 of "The Maple Leaf":
"During the first part of the operation, May 15-31, there were 19 Ilyushin Il-76 flights from KAF; during the second part, from June 4 to 14, a total of 14 flights, including one CF CC-177 Globemaster, moved equipment from KAF"
This article informs us that in May and June 2008, although Canada had 4 C-17s of its own and had access to SALIS's An-124s, just for this operation, it had to charter no less than 32 IL-76 flights between Kahndahar and Camp Mirage.
Although the older IL-76s were banned from the airspace of most "Western" countries in 2002 because they no longer meet the ICAO Annex 16, Chapter 3 noise and pollution standards, they are given waivers to operate in such airspace when on charter to the Armed Forces of NATO members. These older IL-76s are a regular sight at European military bases.
Here is one in Bulgaria in May 2009. Another one in the Czech Republic in Sept 2009. Another one in Germany in August 2009. Another one in the Netherlands in June 2009. Another one in Poland in April 2009. Another one in Spain in February 2009. Another one in France in November 2008. All of the pictured aircraft are Chapter II aircraft that could not legally fly into the airports they were pictured in unless they were on "special" charters (military, government, disaster relief etc) Yet, older Chapter II IL-76s are seen in Europe on a daily basis. Why? Because they are badly needed.
The newer IL-76TD-90, which have modern PS-90 engines however, meet ICAO Annex 16 Chapter IV standards and can legally fly in any airspace in the World without having to obtain waivers. Volga-Dnepr, which is one of the SALIS providers, owns two such IL-76TD-90s, which are brand new (both delivered to the airline in 2007-2008). Most, however, if not all of the IL-76s that are under charter with ISAF countries, are the older Chapter II IL-76s.
MY SUGGESTION
What I am suggesting is that both SALIS and SAC be augmented with IL-76 aircraft.
The reason I think the IL-76 were not included in the original SALIS agreement was a question of "guaranteed access". NATO members were worried that when world crisises occured (Tsunamis etc) that the very few commercial An-124 available in the World (there are currently 26 commercial An-124s) would quickly become tied up in relief work and would not be available to the NATO members for military work. Because of the prevalence of the IL-76 in the World (the 2009 World airliner census of Flight International indicates that there are 233 commercial IL-76s in the World), and many more in the Air Forces of friendly nations (Ukraine alone has over 50) guaranteed access was not considered a problem for the IL-76. It was left to individual NATO members to sort out between dozens of IL-76 operators (many of them shady and un-reliable) to charter their own IL-76s.
I am convinced that if SALIS was augmented with reliable and professionally operated IL-76s, that NATO members would sign-in to SALIS obtain a number of hours on these aircraft. This is the interim solution.
I also think that SAC, which will own its own Boeing C-17s and operates them with NATO-member military pilots at the controls, should also be augmented with several IL-76s aircraft. These should be either brand new IL-76MD-90 ordered from the factory, and instrumented to NATO standards, or the new stretch version the IL-76MF-90 which has a 60 tonne capacity, also upgraded with NATO standard avionics. Regardless of the option chosen, NATO would end up with aircraft costing well under 100 million dollars a piece. A cheaper alternative would be to purchase used IL-76MDs and upgrade them to the IL-76MD-90 standard, by installing new Perm PS-90 engines and upgrade their avionics to NATO standards. (Russia has begun to re-engine its own Il-76MDs with PS-90s) These would probably end up costing well under 50 million dollars each. By adding the IL-76 to its fleet, SAC would provide its members, in addition to the $45,000 dollars an hour and 75 tonne capacity Boeing C-17, another 50 to 60 tonne capacity IL-76 that would probably cost no more than $20,000 an hour to operate. Many NATO members who iniatally balked at joining SAC because of the price and the size of the C-17, which is more expensive than they pay to rent a 120 tonne capacity civilian An-124, may be tempted to join SAC. They would join by paying for X number of hours of C-17, and Y number of hours of IL-76, or just one or the other. That would make SAC much more flexible in the type of Strategic Airlift it could provide for its members.
The IL-76 would also increase SAC's capabilities for there are things IL-76s can do that C-17s cannot do and vice-versa. SAC is based in Hungary, a country which has alway operated civilian IL-76s and that still has at least on IL-76 on civilian aircraft register. There is an IL-76 expertise in that country.
But the United States would never allow such an idea to go forward. It's considered heresy for ex-Cold War warriors to even consider operating Russian made equipment.
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Note : Funny that the US willingly buys Russian and Ukrainian aircraft (An-32, Mi-8/17, Mi 24/35) and arms (Kalashnikovs) for its Afghan and Iraqi allies but will not use any itself.
BACKGROUND
With NATO's first time involvement in a conflict that was not only outside of Europe, but was located in far-away and land-locked Afghanistan, most of the Alliance's members felt the dire need for heavy ramped Strategic Airlift, a resource possessed in 2001 by only two NATO/ISAF members, the US with its 200+ C-5s and C-17s fleet, and Great Britain, which had, just the previous year, leased 4 C-17s from Boeing.
The rests of the NATO members had only tactical aircraft such as C-130s and C-160s or larger so-called "strategic aircraft" that were based on civilian airliners, meaning not only that they were devoid of a rear loading ramp and thus unable to carry any of the rolling stock or any of the helicopters, but needed airport equipment to offload them : aircraft such as the A310 (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany) , the L-1011 and the VC-10 (United Kingdom). None of the non-NATO members of ISAF had any real ramped Strategic Airlift either. In the early days of post-911, the USA obliged its eager allies with its own fleet of C-17s and C-5s to move troops, equipment and supplies into Afghanistan, but when in early 2003, they turned their focus away from Afghanistan and toward Iraq, they needed their Strategic Aircraft for themselves and the members of the "Coalition of the Willing", those like the UK that were willing to attack Iraq with them. The ISAF nations not involved in Iraq were left holding the pot in Afghanistan and there was a scramble to hire and lease the only ramped strategic aircraft that were available for hire, and those were the hundreds of civilian-registered Il-76s that were operated by many countries and the 20 or so An-124s that were operated mainly by three airlines: Antonov Airlines, Volga-Dnepr and Polet. Antonov Airlines also had two other aircraft, a single An-225 that was pressed into Afghan service for certain flights and one An-22. Thes two aircraft completed the World's civilian ramped Strategic Aircraft fleet.
This Strategic Airlift crisis, prompted Germany in 2005 to get 15 members of NATO, including Canada, to pool together to create SALIS, the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution, which was anugurated in early 2006. Its members all paid for a certain number of hours of An-124 use (each according to their respective needs), which gives them guaranteed use of two full-time An-124s which are based at Leipzig-Halle, and quick access to 4 other An-124. The An-124s are provided by Ukrainian Antonov Airlines and Russian Volga-Dnepr Airlines. These aircraft are civilian-registered and are operated, crewed and maintained by civilian personnel of their respective airlines. NATO's Website has a page on SALIS here.
(Note: you'll remember that Germany, who operated East-Germany-inherited Soviet built aircraft in 1989, is not as adverse as other older NATO members to use Eastern-built aircraft and was the one Western country that seriously considered purchasing the Ukrainian An-70 rather than sign on to the Airbus A-400M project)
Later in 2006, the US agressively promoted an idea for NATO members to pool together for a long term Strategic Airlift unit that would mimic the 15-member pool that NATO had long ago established to operate its E-3A AWACS. This pool, called Strategic Airlift Capability, or SAC, would purchase and operate a number of Boeing C-17 Strategic Airlift aircraft. The pilots would come from the armed forces of the SAC member countries, and the maintenance would be contracted out to Boeing. After much pressure on the part of the US for NATO members to join, SAC was finally created with 10 NATO countries and two Partners for Peace countries. It is based in Hungary. SAC has recently taken delivery of its first C-17s. Although very expensive to purchase and operate, I had suggested earlier that Canada should join SAC rather than purchase and operate its own C-17s. In a pool, at least one pays for a limited number of hours, even if those hours are expensive. When one operates a fleet of aircraft, the costs are astronomical.
In the meantime, Canada purchased 4 C-17s and Great Britain not only purchased the 4 it had previously leased in 2000, but purchased 2 more, for a total of 6 RAF C-17s. The US, which had capped it orders at 180 C-17s, increased them 190, then to 205 earlier this year.
SALIS, has for members Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Turkey.
The NATO members which joined SAC are Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and the United States.
Because it is certainly related and has an impact on their country's interest in SALIS and SAC, these are the NATO countries that are waiting for the Airbus A-400Ms they ordered: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Finland and Sweden, which are not NATO members, also have A-400Ms on order.
The UK owns 6 C-17s and has 25 A-400Ms on order.
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain and the UK are all members of SALIS and also have Airbus A-400Ms on order.
The US will have 205 C-17 when all are delivered (it has taken delivery of about 196 as I write these words) and a little over 100 C-5s (some are being retired), plus is a the founding member of SAC which is to have a total of 3 C-17s.
Canada, which has 4 C-17s of its own is a also a member of SALIS.
Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia and Sweden are members of both SALIS and SAC.
All these measures and acquisitions do not prevent most NATO members from regularly chartering extra civilian Strategic Aircraft to meet their transport needs. Many NATO members regularly not only charter An-124 and An-225 outside of the SALIS contract, but mostly, many members, including Canada, have on-going contracts with several operators of the smaller 45 to 50 tonne capacity IL-76. This is because often the An-124s are just too big for the immediate needs of the NATO members and the smaller Il-76 is better suited to the trip. An IL-76 costs about 50% less to charter than an An-124 but it can carry all but the largest and the heaviest of the tanks and other outsize military vehicles. The IL-76 can land in relatively short unpaved runways, which the civilian An-124s do not do. Its landing gear configuration gives it a very low Aircraft Classification Number, which allows it to land in certain soft runways that are off limits to the C-17. The vast majority of the Canadian military supplies and hardware in Afghanistan were flown in, not in An-124s, but inside IL-76s. Even today, although Canada' Air Force owns and operates 4 C-17s and is a member of SALIS, it still makes liberal use of IL-76 charters. As we can read in the article "Not letting the dust settle" of this issue of the 9 July 2008 of "The Maple Leaf":
"During the first part of the operation, May 15-31, there were 19 Ilyushin Il-76 flights from KAF; during the second part, from June 4 to 14, a total of 14 flights, including one CF CC-177 Globemaster, moved equipment from KAF"
This article informs us that in May and June 2008, although Canada had 4 C-17s of its own and had access to SALIS's An-124s, just for this operation, it had to charter no less than 32 IL-76 flights between Kahndahar and Camp Mirage.
Although the older IL-76s were banned from the airspace of most "Western" countries in 2002 because they no longer meet the ICAO Annex 16, Chapter 3 noise and pollution standards, they are given waivers to operate in such airspace when on charter to the Armed Forces of NATO members. These older IL-76s are a regular sight at European military bases.
Here is one in Bulgaria in May 2009. Another one in the Czech Republic in Sept 2009. Another one in Germany in August 2009. Another one in the Netherlands in June 2009. Another one in Poland in April 2009. Another one in Spain in February 2009. Another one in France in November 2008. All of the pictured aircraft are Chapter II aircraft that could not legally fly into the airports they were pictured in unless they were on "special" charters (military, government, disaster relief etc) Yet, older Chapter II IL-76s are seen in Europe on a daily basis. Why? Because they are badly needed.
The newer IL-76TD-90, which have modern PS-90 engines however, meet ICAO Annex 16 Chapter IV standards and can legally fly in any airspace in the World without having to obtain waivers. Volga-Dnepr, which is one of the SALIS providers, owns two such IL-76TD-90s, which are brand new (both delivered to the airline in 2007-2008). Most, however, if not all of the IL-76s that are under charter with ISAF countries, are the older Chapter II IL-76s.
MY SUGGESTION
What I am suggesting is that both SALIS and SAC be augmented with IL-76 aircraft.
The reason I think the IL-76 were not included in the original SALIS agreement was a question of "guaranteed access". NATO members were worried that when world crisises occured (Tsunamis etc) that the very few commercial An-124 available in the World (there are currently 26 commercial An-124s) would quickly become tied up in relief work and would not be available to the NATO members for military work. Because of the prevalence of the IL-76 in the World (the 2009 World airliner census of Flight International indicates that there are 233 commercial IL-76s in the World), and many more in the Air Forces of friendly nations (Ukraine alone has over 50) guaranteed access was not considered a problem for the IL-76. It was left to individual NATO members to sort out between dozens of IL-76 operators (many of them shady and un-reliable) to charter their own IL-76s.
I am convinced that if SALIS was augmented with reliable and professionally operated IL-76s, that NATO members would sign-in to SALIS obtain a number of hours on these aircraft. This is the interim solution.
I also think that SAC, which will own its own Boeing C-17s and operates them with NATO-member military pilots at the controls, should also be augmented with several IL-76s aircraft. These should be either brand new IL-76MD-90 ordered from the factory, and instrumented to NATO standards, or the new stretch version the IL-76MF-90 which has a 60 tonne capacity, also upgraded with NATO standard avionics. Regardless of the option chosen, NATO would end up with aircraft costing well under 100 million dollars a piece. A cheaper alternative would be to purchase used IL-76MDs and upgrade them to the IL-76MD-90 standard, by installing new Perm PS-90 engines and upgrade their avionics to NATO standards. (Russia has begun to re-engine its own Il-76MDs with PS-90s) These would probably end up costing well under 50 million dollars each. By adding the IL-76 to its fleet, SAC would provide its members, in addition to the $45,000 dollars an hour and 75 tonne capacity Boeing C-17, another 50 to 60 tonne capacity IL-76 that would probably cost no more than $20,000 an hour to operate. Many NATO members who iniatally balked at joining SAC because of the price and the size of the C-17, which is more expensive than they pay to rent a 120 tonne capacity civilian An-124, may be tempted to join SAC. They would join by paying for X number of hours of C-17, and Y number of hours of IL-76, or just one or the other. That would make SAC much more flexible in the type of Strategic Airlift it could provide for its members.
The IL-76 would also increase SAC's capabilities for there are things IL-76s can do that C-17s cannot do and vice-versa. SAC is based in Hungary, a country which has alway operated civilian IL-76s and that still has at least on IL-76 on civilian aircraft register. There is an IL-76 expertise in that country.
But the United States would never allow such an idea to go forward. It's considered heresy for ex-Cold War warriors to even consider operating Russian made equipment.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Note : Funny that the US willingly buys Russian and Ukrainian aircraft (An-32, Mi-8/17, Mi 24/35) and arms (Kalashnikovs) for its Afghan and Iraqi allies but will not use any itself.
Thursday, September 24, 2009
From the horse's mouth
An index of all posts
As a justification for buying our 4 Boieng C-17s, Canada (DND, the CF, the PMO and several other actors) attempted to portray the chartered Strategic Airlift IL-76s and An-124s we had been relying on until then, as expensive, unreliable, un-garanteed and unsafe. This is why, according to them, it was justified to not only spend 3.4 billion dollars of Taxpayer-funded DND money on Strategic Airlift, but also to make the C-17 purchase a priority by fast tracking the acquisition in a manner that resulted in a a record breaking sole-source purchase, with barely 13 months from the initial SOR publication to the delivery of the first aircraft.
I have since found the testimony of three Air Force Generals, a Canadian, an American and a French, that all say that chartered airlift works well, is cheap, is safe, and is reliable.
On October 4, 2006, a few months after the Conservative government ordered 4 C-17s from Boeing, Major General Daniel Benjamin testified before the Standing Committee on National Defence. His testimony was meant to back-up the C-17 purchase. I wrote about it previously here. But here is also what he had to say:
Mr. Laurie Hawn (Edmonton Centre, CPC): Thank you, General, and thank you, gentlemen, for joining us. As we all know, operations is the rose and logistics is the stem upon which it grows. I just have a comment with regard to strategic airlift and the use of it in North America. You may or may not have been involved with it--probably not--but all the heavy equipment for the ice storm and the floods in Manitoba was moved by U.S. Air Force C-17s. It would be nice to have our own. We do a lot of contracting with civilian and other military carriers. What are your biggest challenges in that with respect to dealing with the Ukrainians, the U.S. Air Force, the Brits, or whoever? How well is that working, and what challenges are you facing?
MGen Daniel Benjamin: In Kandahar?
Mr. Laurie Hawn: No, in contracting to get equipment from Canada to Kandahar.
MGen Daniel Benjamin: That's working really, really well. We have what we call the out-of-Canada network, through the military and defence attachés, embassies, and so on. We optimize this network to really get to the equipment, have the flight clearances and so on, and bring the equipment directly from the manufacturer to the theatre. That is working beautifully.
That was not, of course, at all what what Mr Laurie Hawn wanted Gen Benjamin to say when he asked that question.
The following tear, on September 27 2007, General Norton A. Schwartz, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Air Force, testified in before the FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICES, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE of the COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS of the UNITED STATES SENATE.
(they just love those long titles in the US. One of my all-time favorites was the now defunct FTTTF, the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force of the US Department of Justice. At least they were honest in that they couln't care less about US terrorists, they were just concerned with the Foreign kind)
Anyway, here is the relevant part of that exchange:
Senator Carper : OK. Fair enough. One of the things we have talked about in, I think, conversations certainly with Secretary Payton and General Schwartz and others, too, the question on strategic airlift needs, we need big aircraft and we have the option of flying C-5s or we have the option of RERP-ing and modernizing the C-5s. We have the option of going out and leasing other aircraft. There is an aircraft that is actually bigger than the C-5, maybe a couple, but one of them is the AN-124 and it turns out it is a Russian aircraft. I was startled to find out that we have wound up and paid almost $200 million to the Russians to lease to us the AN-124. I am not criticizing that decision, but as a cold war warrior, the idea that we are paying that kind of money to the Russians so that they can let us use their airplanes to provide strategic airlift because we don't have it is a real irony. Does the AN-124 carry something that the C-5 can't? I asked my staff to dig out for me, like MRAPs (Note: at that point the US Air Force was shipping 360 MRAPs a month by air). I said, tell me what it costs per MRAP to carry them in an AN-124, a C-17, or a C-5, and they came back and they told me--I hope these numbers are correct--they said, if you are flying a C-17 carrying MRAPs, it is about $150,000 per vehicle. If you are sending them over in AN-124s, it is about $134,000 per vehicle. If we are flying them over in C-5s, it is about $125,000 per vehicle. So they can all carry MRAPs, but there is a difference in the cost of delivering each vehicle. Are there some things that the AN-124 can carry that the C-5 cannot? Has our reliance on the AN-124, the Russian aircraft, accelerated of late? I know we have been using them for a while. And does the Air Force plan to continue to lease the 124s?
General Schwartz : Sir, let me take that question because I am the operator here. The AN-124 is an excellent vehicle carrier. In fact, it has somewhat greater capacity than the C-5. The AN-124 can carry five or six, depending which MRAP category you are speaking to, four or five on the C-5, two or three on the C-17.
Senator Carper : But in terms of the cost per vehicle, were my cost numbers about right?
General Schwartz : The numbers you have are about right. I would say that, frankly, C-5 and AN-124 are about the same, $130,000 in round numbers. But the difference is reliability. Mr. Chairman, when the AN-124 goes--when it is scheduled, it flies, and----
Senator Carper : Do they have some kind of cost penalties built in so that if they don't, they pay a heavy cost?
General Schwartz : No, sir. They just operate. They are a very reliable outfit. And by the way, we access that capability through our CRAF partners, Atlas Air, a U.S. company, Lynden Air, another U.S. company. But the key point here is that they fly, and when the expectation is that we will move MRAPs as expeditiously as possible because kids are in jeopardy, I am not going to have airplanes broke in Europe or somewhere else when I have an alternative which, to date, has not resulted in a late delivery.
Senator Carper : OK.
General Schwartz : Yes, sir.
As a justification for buying our 4 Boieng C-17s, Canada (DND, the CF, the PMO and several other actors) attempted to portray the chartered Strategic Airlift IL-76s and An-124s we had been relying on until then, as expensive, unreliable, un-garanteed and unsafe. This is why, according to them, it was justified to not only spend 3.4 billion dollars of Taxpayer-funded DND money on Strategic Airlift, but also to make the C-17 purchase a priority by fast tracking the acquisition in a manner that resulted in a a record breaking sole-source purchase, with barely 13 months from the initial SOR publication to the delivery of the first aircraft.
I have since found the testimony of three Air Force Generals, a Canadian, an American and a French, that all say that chartered airlift works well, is cheap, is safe, and is reliable.
On October 4, 2006, a few months after the Conservative government ordered 4 C-17s from Boeing, Major General Daniel Benjamin testified before the Standing Committee on National Defence. His testimony was meant to back-up the C-17 purchase. I wrote about it previously here. But here is also what he had to say:
Mr. Laurie Hawn (Edmonton Centre, CPC): Thank you, General, and thank you, gentlemen, for joining us. As we all know, operations is the rose and logistics is the stem upon which it grows. I just have a comment with regard to strategic airlift and the use of it in North America. You may or may not have been involved with it--probably not--but all the heavy equipment for the ice storm and the floods in Manitoba was moved by U.S. Air Force C-17s. It would be nice to have our own. We do a lot of contracting with civilian and other military carriers. What are your biggest challenges in that with respect to dealing with the Ukrainians, the U.S. Air Force, the Brits, or whoever? How well is that working, and what challenges are you facing?
MGen Daniel Benjamin: In Kandahar?
Mr. Laurie Hawn: No, in contracting to get equipment from Canada to Kandahar.
MGen Daniel Benjamin: That's working really, really well. We have what we call the out-of-Canada network, through the military and defence attachés, embassies, and so on. We optimize this network to really get to the equipment, have the flight clearances and so on, and bring the equipment directly from the manufacturer to the theatre. That is working beautifully.
That was not, of course, at all what what Mr Laurie Hawn wanted Gen Benjamin to say when he asked that question.
The following tear, on September 27 2007, General Norton A. Schwartz, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Air Force, testified in before the FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICES, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE of the COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS of the UNITED STATES SENATE.
(they just love those long titles in the US. One of my all-time favorites was the now defunct FTTTF, the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force of the US Department of Justice. At least they were honest in that they couln't care less about US terrorists, they were just concerned with the Foreign kind)
Anyway, here is the relevant part of that exchange:
Senator Carper : OK. Fair enough. One of the things we have talked about in, I think, conversations certainly with Secretary Payton and General Schwartz and others, too, the question on strategic airlift needs, we need big aircraft and we have the option of flying C-5s or we have the option of RERP-ing and modernizing the C-5s. We have the option of going out and leasing other aircraft. There is an aircraft that is actually bigger than the C-5, maybe a couple, but one of them is the AN-124 and it turns out it is a Russian aircraft. I was startled to find out that we have wound up and paid almost $200 million to the Russians to lease to us the AN-124. I am not criticizing that decision, but as a cold war warrior, the idea that we are paying that kind of money to the Russians so that they can let us use their airplanes to provide strategic airlift because we don't have it is a real irony. Does the AN-124 carry something that the C-5 can't? I asked my staff to dig out for me, like MRAPs (Note: at that point the US Air Force was shipping 360 MRAPs a month by air). I said, tell me what it costs per MRAP to carry them in an AN-124, a C-17, or a C-5, and they came back and they told me--I hope these numbers are correct--they said, if you are flying a C-17 carrying MRAPs, it is about $150,000 per vehicle. If you are sending them over in AN-124s, it is about $134,000 per vehicle. If we are flying them over in C-5s, it is about $125,000 per vehicle. So they can all carry MRAPs, but there is a difference in the cost of delivering each vehicle. Are there some things that the AN-124 can carry that the C-5 cannot? Has our reliance on the AN-124, the Russian aircraft, accelerated of late? I know we have been using them for a while. And does the Air Force plan to continue to lease the 124s?
General Schwartz : Sir, let me take that question because I am the operator here. The AN-124 is an excellent vehicle carrier. In fact, it has somewhat greater capacity than the C-5. The AN-124 can carry five or six, depending which MRAP category you are speaking to, four or five on the C-5, two or three on the C-17.
Senator Carper : But in terms of the cost per vehicle, were my cost numbers about right?
General Schwartz : The numbers you have are about right. I would say that, frankly, C-5 and AN-124 are about the same, $130,000 in round numbers. But the difference is reliability. Mr. Chairman, when the AN-124 goes--when it is scheduled, it flies, and----
Senator Carper : Do they have some kind of cost penalties built in so that if they don't, they pay a heavy cost?
General Schwartz : No, sir. They just operate. They are a very reliable outfit. And by the way, we access that capability through our CRAF partners, Atlas Air, a U.S. company, Lynden Air, another U.S. company. But the key point here is that they fly, and when the expectation is that we will move MRAPs as expeditiously as possible because kids are in jeopardy, I am not going to have airplanes broke in Europe or somewhere else when I have an alternative which, to date, has not resulted in a late delivery.
Senator Carper : OK.
General Schwartz : Yes, sir.
This year, in the August-September issue of "Défense & Sécurité International", Alain Silvy, a French Air Force General gave an interview in an article called "Le Transport aérien militaire français à un tournant historique" (French Military Air Transport at a historical moment) . It's a seven page interview, but when asked about Strategic Airlift, he said that the priority of the French Air Force was in having Tactical Airlift. (the French ordered the A-400M. Unlike the C-17, which is a Strategic Aircraft with some tactical capability, the A-400M is a tactical aircraft with some Strategic capabilities) Although the "Livre Blanc" (White Paper) required a Strategic Airlift capacity he considered that the SALIS contract, which provided France anually with 1,265 hours of An-124 airlift met, in part, the requirement of the French White Paper (as an interim solution). "With leasing you pay as you use" he said. "The disadvantage of owning a fleet of Strategic Aircraft, is that you have to operate and maintain them year round, if only to keep the crews current". He admits that in theory, with SALIS, France may sometimes find itself in competition with other client states, but that this transitional solution, is for the time being, satisfactory.
About the option of buying C-17s, he states that he finds that route attractive. However, he states that if France was to adopt that solution, because the C-17 is extremely costly to buy and operate, France could only purchase about 3 of them, and that operating such a micro-fleet makes it even more costly in terms of maintenance and training. He also thinks that the C-17 may be too large for France's needs, and would often fly with small payloads (overkill). He says that France does not exclude joining NATO's SAC but that this option does not meet France's needs for the time being (no reason given). He finally says that what he would really prefer, as a Startegic Airlift solution (while waiting for the A-400M) is an early delivery of the A330 MRTT that France has already ordered. The A330 MRTT can carry a lot of cargo (although no vehicles or helicopters), it can carry troops over long distances, and it can refuel the fighters and the tactical aircraft which can be tasked with hauling the things the A330s cannot.
Everyone seems to be very satisfied with chartered Airlift but Canada decided they needed their own Strategic fleet, that owning such a fleet was very high on their priority list (there was no CF White Paper at the time) since chartering, leasing, SALIS, NSAC was not adequate for our urgent needs.
Which brings another subject to mind. Look at this list of 78 countries. Canada is not listed.
These countries are listed here (I may have missed a few), because their armed forces all have something in common on their military inventories. Something Canada, which although it has its own strategic aircraft, which most countries don't, decided it did not need.
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Chad, China, Cyprus, Cuba, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Republic of Macedonia, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Republic of China (Taiwan), Republic of Korea, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, USA, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.
There are about a dozen NATO countries here. Any guess at what they have in common that Canada does not?
Are they all wrong about thinking such an item is required in their inventory, or does Canada know better than these 77 counties by chosing not to have what the armed forces of all these countries have?
What would that be? Click here to find out.
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